CAVU Café: Royboy’s Prose & Cons

The following topics will be addressed:

• Background
• Requirements for Removal Tags
• Best Practices for Removal Tags
• Regarding your Trace Trail
• Accredited Disassembly Firms

BACKGROUND

Conspicuous in the aftermarket is the rise in the availability of Used Serviceable Material, USM, traced to aircraft or engine disassembly (AKA part-outs) projects. The disassembly phenomenon is one of the manifestations in the marketplace to mitigate well-known supply chain shortages. Disassembly operations can extend to not just whole aircraft and engines, but to subassemblies thereof. An informative article regarding this practice is titled “Performing Limited Disassembly Is On The Rise” and is available at this link:

https://www.aviationsuppliers.org/performing-limited-disassembly-is-on-the-rise

Regardless of whether the disassembly was for a whole aircraft, Engine, or subassembly, many of you have commercial requirements in your Purchase Order terms and conditions that such parts be provided with documented trace to the last operator/lesser. A critical document which authenticates that the part was removed from the aircraft or engine you have trace to is the Removal Tag, sometimes referred to as an identification tag, or may go by other names to accomplish the same purpose.

REQUIREMENTS FOR REMOVAL TAGS:

Firms which are accredited to perform Disassembly follow the requirements of AFRA’s (Aircraft Fleet Recycling Association) BMP; Best Management Practice for Disassembly. The BMP contains these requirements for the tags:

“Article V c) – Tagging in a Disassembly Operation

BEST PRACTICE (V)(c) 1 – Each part/component removed will have a removal tag bearing the facility name disassembling the asset. Information on the tag must include:

• Manufacturer’s part number

• Serial number (as applicable)

• Part description

• Quantity

• Condition code

• The Next Higher Assembly (NHA) the part was removed from, e.g., MSN, ESN, aircraft registration number (optional, but MSN has precedence), or manufacturer’s serial number for assets which are not Engines or Airframes

• Date removed

• Reason for removal (optional)

• The removal tag must be signed or stamped and dated by the facility or agency representative performing the disassembly. Optionally, the signature/stamp may be digitally generated.”

In addition to the AFRA requirement, China’s CAAC 145 MROs who have it in their Operations Specifications to perform disassembly use a CAAC specified removal tag form.

BEST PRACTICES FOR REMOVAL TAGS:

• Although not a requirement, an emerging best practice is that the tag have a unique number, a tag number.
• For firms performing the disassembly, the final tabulation of parts is a listing commonly called the Manifest, sometimes called the Harvest List. The Manifest would have the corresponding tag number for each part number. Since the tag is affixed to the part, this makes it easy to perform an inventory audit when you sort the Manifest by tag number.
• Another emerging best practice is that the tag has a unique QR code. The QR code could link to:
  • Its Manifest Listing
  • The file of pictures of the parts
  • The trace documents

REGARDING YOUR TRACE TRAIL:

Keep in mind that the company performing the disassembly may be performing it as a service; they were not the owners in the trace trail. Compare this to your owning an AR condition part in which you use the services of a repair station/AMO to have the part overhauled and it is returned to you. There was no exchange of ownership in the transaction, so while the repair station/AMO performed a service, it is not relevant to the actual trace trail.

As with repair stations/AMOs, disassemblers have two options:

• Disassembly is performed as a service for whomever owns the asset (aircraft, engine, major assembly, etc.). In this case they are not an integral part of trace trail.
• The disassembler purchased the assets themselves and owned the subsequent parts. In this case they are an integral part of the trace trail.

Previously I mentioned that at the conclusion of the disassembly project there is a resultant Manifest or Harvest list. If you are buying a single part traced to a disassembly, you may or may not be provided with that Manifest but insist on the Removal Tag. For that single part the Manifest is not really needed since the tag suffices to establish the trace.

On the other hand, there are some firms performing disassembly who are not AFRA accredited and therefor not following the AFRA BMP. Although increasingly rare, such firms may not use a Removal Tag and instead rely wholly on the resultant Manifest. In this case having the Manifest would be critical to establishing the trace otherwise accomplished by the tag, and you should demand it.

ACCREDITED DISASSEMBLY FIRMS:

A directory of firms which are accredited to perform disassembly can be found at this link:

https://www.afraassociation.org/accredited-companies

Make it happen, over ‘n out

Roy ‘Royboy’ Resto

Written without the use of AI

Since many of you have airline customers based in the EU, you may find it interesting that in the future you’ll be supplying parts to airlines participating in Europe’s nascent Civilian Airlift Reserve.

For a background on this concept, read a previous article I wrote called “Masters of Logistics: USTRANSCOM & the Civil Reserve Air Fleet” which contains an introduction to the model.

Here’s the link:

US and EU governments frequently charter airliners for varying purposes including:

• Movement of troops
• Movement of cargo
• Evacuation of citizens from troubled locations
• Refugee evacuations
• Repatriation flights

Charter flights for these purposes are quite routine but can be limited by the availability of airliners. For example, charters during the heavily traveled summer season are going to be predictably challenged because every available airliner is pressed into service to satisfy passenger demand. If, during the summer a real-world military or governmental emergency should arise on short notice, as they often do, timely responses could be hampered by shortages. It is this type of scenario which long ago gave rise to the US’s Civil Reserve Air Fleet, CRAF, to guarantee the availability of aircraft for contingency requirements.

Recently the unfortunate prospect of global and regional conflicts which could affect the EU has given rise to the concept being instituted there to supplement existing and future military airlift assets with additional surge capacity. According to Michael Sylla, the European Defense Agency’s (EDA) project officer for air transport, Europe faces a “strategic airlift gap”¹, thus the emergence of the concept. In May of 2026 the EDA launched a nine-month study to assess operational demand and identify capability gaps according to Sylla. The study will include consultations with leasers, airlines, and cargo carriers. The idea would be that European Airlines would provide aircraft and crews for rapid airlift missions, thereby reducing the need for governments to invest in more military transport fleets.

Historically, individual countries can and continue to press their national flag carriers into service when needed, if they have such carriers. The EU, however, consists of many countries so they are presented with a unique set of circumstances with their own Civil Airlift Reserve concept. One of the challenges the EDA study will have to examine is how do you incentivize air carriers to participate? Of course, those carriers will have to be properly compensated but they already have this with the charters. An interesting idea used by the US’ CRAF program is that participants enjoy preferential status for the rewarding of charters and government employee passenger reservations for frequently traveled routes.

Another EU-unique challenge is how or who will administer the program for the EDA? As described in my previous article, the CRAF program is run by USTRANSCOM. In the EU it appears that a logical early suggestion to fill this role may be the European Air Transport Command based in the Netherlands. Currently this planning cell is responsible for operational control over the air transport and aerial refueling aircraft of seven European air forces.

Another EU-unique hurdle regarding implementation will be the regulatory landscape. No doubt the EDA study will identify this legislative requirement as part of the overall plan.

It would be interesting to end this article with a look at the current state of the US CRAF fleet: 24 carriers and 553 aircraft are enrolled in CRAF. This includes 517 aircraft in the international segment with 391 in the long-range international section and 126 in the short-range international section. There are 36 aircraft in the national segment. These numbers are subject to change on a monthly basis.²

According to the Air Force there are three stages of incremental activation to allow for tailoring an airlift force suitable for the contingency at hand.

• Stage I is for minor regional crises and humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HADR) efforts,
• Stage II would be used for major theater war and
• Stage III for periods of national mobilization.

The EDA model is likely to be some variation of this.

Over ‘n out

Roy ‘Royboy’ Resto

Written without the use of AI

1 – Europe Weighs Civilian Airlift Reserve To Speed Military Deployments; Aviation Week & Space Technology; February 9—22, 2026; Page 41.

2 - https://www.af.mil/About-Us/Fact-Sheets/Display/Article/104583/civil-reserve-air-fleet/

Aircraft certification affects the entire supply logistics chain; both on the front end (manufacturing for installation on production aircraft) and the back end (aftermarket support). This is because certification of the aircraft is what triggers production. And it’s not just the aircraft, it’s the engines too and all their subcomponents.

What frustrates the supply chain is the unpredictability in the timing of the granting of these certifications, making production planning and spares planning an exercise in uncertainty. Complicating the certification landscape, and therefor slowing it down, is the global aspect of aircraft certifications. For example, to get an aircraft Type Certificated for worldwide sales and operations would typically involve separate and distinct certifications from EASA, FAA, ANAC, and TCCA among others. News stories of interruptions for newly designed aircraft deliveries due to certification delays are as rife as the privately expressed frustrations with the process. This begs the question, is there any movement to eliminate the duplication and complexity of these procedures?

I first hinted at these issues in a previous article I wrote titled “Will There Ever Be a Single Set of Globally Accepted Certification Standards? You’re encouraged to read this primer at this link:

https://www.aviationsuppliers.org/will-there-ever-be-a-single-set-of-globally-accepted-certification-standards

That article hints at globalization ideas which may be promulgated by independent standard-setting entities such as IATA, but are there any other moves afoot? Albeit incremental, yes there are. Herein is an encouraging summary of what’s occurring, lets connect some dots:

US Senators, Reps Introduce Aviation Innovation and Global Competitiveness Act

• As highlighted in the article “Congressmen Look to Streamline FAA Certification Amid AAM Growth”¹, legislators are introducing the Act in the hope that it would ‘establish clearer timelines for FAA responses to exemption petitions and issue papers, define when additional review documentation is required, and expand delegation authority for routine compliance findings. It also tells the agency to report to Congress on certification workload and reform implementation.’ The Act is represented as one that would increase domestic competitiveness and aid in the timely introduction of new aerospace technologies, bravo, bring it.

Deliberate sidebar. I couldn’t help myself. Notice that the legislator’s summary includes ‘…and expand delegation authority…’ It wasn’t too long ago that this same body was holding hearings on the Max and there was alarming talk about curtailing delegation authority. What a difference a little time can make. For more information in this, read my article titled “MAX, ODAs, BABIES, AND BATHWATER” at this link:

https://www.aviationsuppliers.org/max-odas-babies-and-bathwater

Joint Certifications

• The article “FAA Takes Another Look At Joint Certifications”², Bill Carey (thanks Bill!) does a great job of bringing some interesting insights to the concept of Joint Certifications. The idea of ‘Joint’ being the hope that the various aviation authorities would accept each other’s certifications and therefor simplify and reduce the costs and delays of certification. The idea was put on paper in the form of a charter establishing a Certification Management Team (CMT) in September 2015. The directors of the certification services of the FAA, Brazil’s ANAC, the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, and Transport Canada signed it. When you read press releases whereby OEMs achieve simultaneous certifications from multiple aviation authorities, it is likely facilitated by this process.

The article, however, mainly focuses on the occasional shortcomings of this process owing to geopolitics and the maddening details of perceived risks. Nonetheless the charter is a great move in the right direction, and as it matures things like this will hopefully get sorted.

Country-to-country efforts to accelerate certifications

• The last two decades have seen India make impressive progress in developing its aerospace industry. Pursuant to this, the Directorate General of Civil Aviation (DGCA) and the FAA have announced a new working arrangement which will establish clearer mechanisms to facilitate aircraft and engine type validation, as well as recognition and acceptance procedures between the two authorities. ‘The arrangement, announced March 5, has been established under the regulators’ Bilateral Aviation Safety Agreement and complements the existing Implementation Procedures for Airworthiness already in place between the two agencies. The new cooperation is designed to streamline certification processes and enhance transparency in the management of aircraft and engine approvals between India and the U.S.’³.

Summary:

The actions presented here and in my previous article may seem disparate, but the correlation among these dots is that everyone wants the process to be streamlined, and accelerated, and of course, without compromising safety…

Over ‘n out

Roy ‘Royboy’ Resto

Written without the use of AI

1 - https://www.aero-news.net/FullsizeImage.cfm?do=main.textpost&id=B759A78E-9593-43CA-B325-092C9624AE6F

2 - https://aviationweek.com/business-aviation/safety-ops-regulation/faa-takes-another-look-joint-certifications

3 - https://aviationweek.com/mro/safety-ops-regulation/mro-memo-india-us-regulators-oems-seek-streamlined-cooperation

I’m writing this article because of the great variation seen in the distribution community regarding the inspection staff who are typically the receiving and shipping inspectors. I encounter many inspectors that I would be proud to have on my own staff in the aircraft operations world or MROs, yet others who frankly may be better suited to sales, purchasing, or administration functions. We’ll come back to this occurrence towards the end and solicit your opinion.

It’s interesting that in many quality systems both in aviation and otherwise, there is the concept of certified inspectors. “Certified” in the broadest sense meaning that these inspectors are formally designated, approved, or literally certificated. Here are some interesting ones:

• CQI: Certified Quality Inspector (CQI). According to the ASQ¹: “The Certified Quality Inspector is an inspector who, in support of and under the direction of quality engineers, supervisors, or technicians, can use the proven techniques included in the body of knowledge. Under professional direction, the quality inspector evaluates hardware documentation, performs laboratory procedures, inspects products, measures process performance, records data and prepares formal reports.”

The training for this is quite broad and rigorous and of course is subject to testing. The training involves many topics familiar to Quality Engineers.

• IDEA-ICE-3000 Professional Inspector Certification. For firms which manufacture or distribute electronic products for the defense, consumer, and aerospace markets, the prevention of counterfeit electronic components from entering the supply chain is the focus of new quality standards and mitigation measures. For more information on this phenomenon, read my article on Counterfeit Electronic Parts; https://www.aviationsuppliers.org/counterfeit-electronic-parts

According to one supplier of such parts²:

The certification of inspectors for this purpose is administered by IDEA and is based on a standard called IDEA-STD-1010: Acceptability of Electronic Components Distributed in the Open Market. Companies requiring their inspectors to be certified to this standard must follow the process described in the program IDEA-ICE-3000 Professional Inspector Certification Exam³. The program involves training and testing.

• RII Inspectors: Required Inspection Items are generally defined as tasks where improper maintenance or improper parts could result in a failure, malfunction, or defect endangering the aircraft's safe operation. The task is considered critical for safety and therefor its performance must be countersigned (a ‘second set of eyes’) by a designated inspector authorized for RII specifically. Typical RII tasks include engine changes, work on the flight control system, and work on the pitot-static system among others.

• NDT/NDI Inspectors: In aerospace these Non-Destructive Testing/Non-Destructive Inspection employees are highly trained and use specialized equipment to evaluate materials, components, or systems for defects without causing damage, ensuring safety and reliability. These methods, including ultrasonic, radiographic (X-ray), magnetic particle, eddy current, and liquid penetrant tests, detect internal or surface flaws like cracks, voids, or corrosion, saving money and preventing failures. For each method there are levels of qualification, testing (written and practical), and recurrent training.

• Return to Service Inspectors: These are highly trained and licensed/certificated employees who are authorized by their firms to sign for products or articles following MRO (Maintenance, Repair, or Overhaul) activity as being airworthy and therefor are being returned to service (RTS). Typically, the RTS is attested for either on EASA Form 1, FAA 8130-3, or aircraft logbook entries, among others.
  • For EASA, the employee typically must have Certifying Staff (B1/B2/C) License
  • For the FAA, an Airframe and/or Powerplant, or Repairman Certificate
  • Both must be authorized as such on the firm’s Roster (FAA) or Register (EASA).

As expected, in addition to the noted basic certifications or licenses, these inspectors are highly trained and authorized.

• FAA Inspection Authorization, IA: According to the FAA’s Inspection Authorization Information Guide⁴, .’… an IA may inspect and approve for return to service any aircraft or related part or appliance after a major repair or major alteration. Also, the holder of an IA may perform an annual inspection, and he or she may supervise or perform a progressive inspection.’

IA’s are typically very experienced A&Ps who must undergo testing, and initial and recurrent training.

• Designated Manufacturing Inspection Representatives, DMIR: A DMIR conducts conformity inspections during the manufacturing process. DMIRs also issue certificates such as airworthiness certificates for aircraft, export certificates for aircraft and parts, and special flight permits. A DMIR must possess aeronautical knowledge and experience, be employed by a Production Approval Holder (PAH), or a PAH's approved supplier, and meet the qualification requirements of FAA Order 8000.95, Designee Management Policy⁵.

There are other examples including DARs and ODA staff, but the point is made that the idea of certified inspectors is not new and in fact they play a key role in contributing to safety and quality.

Why the variation in inspector skill levels in the distributor community? Let’s talk.

• Excellent performance: Here the key is that they are looked upon with respect and have the authority to perform their duties. Here are some possible indicators:
  • Low turnover.
  • Regarding the method to document all discrepancies found during the receiving process: Consistent entries.
  • Training exceeds the requirements of the manual and there is recurrent training. The inspectors are not just trained, they are competent. For more on this read an article I wrote titled "TRAINING VS COMPETENCY” at:
  • https://www.aviationsuppliers.org/training-vs-competency

• Subpar performance: I have seen companies where the inspectors are looked upon as low-level hourly employees and treated as warehouse workers whose main purpose is to receive and ship products as quickly as possible so the salespeople can meet their quotas and commissions. There, I said it and I meant it. Here are some possible indicators:
  • Higher than normal turnover.
  • Regarding the method to document all discrepancies found during the receiving process: Very low amounts of entries.
  • Documented training only meets the minimum requirements of the manual. There is no investment in raising the skill levels or additional training beyond the manual requirement. There is no recurrent training.
  • The equivalent of the Quarantine or QA Hold area is empty or consists solely of parts to be scrapped or has a single part for window dressing for an audit (whew…yup).
  • If the inspector doesn’t sign the C of C, a salesperson on the roster will.

Paralleling these ideas is an informative article about the importance of being an inspection roster. Here is the link: https://www.aviationsuppliers.org/the-importance-of-being-on-a-roster

The ASA has tinkered with the idea of having a program to certify distribution inspectors. If you have made it this far in article, you are greatly encouraged to leave your thoughts about this in the comments section below.

Make it happen, over ‘n out

Roy ‘Royboy’ Resto

www.AimSolutionsConsulting.com

Crafted without the use of AI.

1 - https://www.asq.org/cert/quality-inspector

2 - https://www.aeri.com/idea-ice3000-inspection-qualifications/

3 - https://idofea.org/inspector-certification/

4 - https://www.faa.gov/training_testing/testing/ia_info_guide.pdf

5 - https://www.faa.gov/other_visit/aviation_industry/designees_delegations/individual_designees/manufacturing

This is now my third article on this topic and here’s the link to the previous post:

https://www.aviationsuppliers.org/REVISITED-MILITARY-8130-3-S

What prompted me to write this is a major, welcomed update regarding the use of the 8130-3 for Return to Service (RTS) for military and/or government parts. But first the big picture:

The big picture:

FAA Form 8130-3 Instructions are now in different documents:

There was a single 75-page order for filling out the 8130-3. With the issuance of FAA Order 8130.21J, those instructions have now been divided into separate documents depending on the purpose of the form.

- Order 8130.21J - Completion of FAA Form 8130-3 under Part 21
- AC 43-9D - Maintenance Records and FAA Form 8130-3 Return to Service
- FAA Order 8120.22, Production Approval Procedures
- FAA Order 8110.4, Type Certification
- FAA Order 8120.18, Approvals for RTS issued by production approval holders (PAH) for inspections and alterations on aircraft engines, propellers, or articles manufactured by the PAH

For MROs who are not Production Approval Holders (PAHs), AC 43-9D now contains the instructions for filling out the 8130-3 for purposes of a Return to Service, after for example, Overhaul, Repair, Inspect/Testing, etc.

Background:

From my previously cited article it appears the FAA has supported the use of the form for military/government purposes for some time. There was a big problem with this however, there was no guidance whatsoever in the historic Order 8130.21 and so there was varying, if any degree of implementation. When the FAA asked for feedback at an ASA QA committee meeting regarding the pending big picture items above, I put forth the argument for the FAA to finally put this issue to rest and give us simple guidance for this purpose. The language they presented in the subsequent draft was kept and now resides in revision D of AC 43-9. Bravo.

Before getting to specifics there should be a point of clarification about the parts in question. For purposes of this discussion, we can generally group military/government parts into two groupings:

• Dual use parts. Loosely, these are parts that can be used in either civilian or military applications. For example, the Air Force uses 737s for VIP transport, designated the C-40. The 737 is of course a type certificated product and many of the parts on the C-40 are dual use. Use of 8130-3s for these parts has long been transparently in use with no issues.
• Non-dual use parts, an F-16 landing gear actuator for example. It is these parts which are the subject of this article.

Why use the 8130-3 for these types of parts?

• It would be desirable to have a single form to attest to the airworthiness of civilian or military/government parts; uniformity and simplicity.

• Many of you perform MRO work for nations flying for example, UH-60 Blackhawks, F-16s, F-15s, C-130s, and F-35s among many others. I have seen more than a few solicitations from those nations whereby they are seeking MRO providers for component maintenance. Often, they insist in their terms and conditions that it be accomplished by a FAA Part 145 MRO, and further that an 8130-3 be issued with the parts. The insistence on the 145 is for the reasonable expectation that the 145 Quality System will be applied to the parts even though they’re military parts. The requirement for the 8130-3 was problematic. Some FSDOs told their MROs that they couldn’t do it, other FSDOs insisted they could. Guess who got the work contract from the overseas customer? Yes, the MROs doing it. Cries of alacrity and market distortion from those who didn’t get the contract. Remarkably some MROs altered the 8130-3 form for military purposes. Thankfully we now have some guidance!

AC Excerpt:

A compliant form:

According to the AC the form would be filled out in all respects with the exception of the 14a block not being checked.

The form would not be eligible for a dual release since those rely essentially on the FAR being followed. For military parts this is typically not an issue.

Notice that there is still no FAA FAR requiring use of an 8130-3 for any purpose, so the use of the form for this purpose remains voluntary.

If you’re implementing this, Royboy highly recommends that you create a transparent procedure, process, or work instruction to support its use.

As with all things new, the industry may have growing pains as this rolls out. For example, a customer may think you made a mistake by not checking block 14a. In this case it is recommended that an explanatory NOTE be added as shown in the example. By the way, I also wrote another article titled “REMARKS On Your Documents Are Your Friend”. Here’s the link:

https://www.aviationsuppliers.org/remarks-on-your-documents-are-your-friend

Make it happen, over ‘n out

Roy ‘Royboy’ Resto

www.AimSolutionsConsulting.com

Crafted without the use of AI.

Scenario 1:

A company reached out to me with a question. I thought it was an odd question coming from them. Did the parts they receive require an 8130-3? This was for some hardware, and we first established that the part numbers did not fit the definition of Standard Parts. So, under the circumstances presented and the requirements in their own manual the answer was yes. They then showed me the documentation received with the parts which they had already received and placed into working shop stock. There was no 8130-3 and just a typical C of C which did not mention a TSO or PMA statement, and the parts were not received from a TC/PC (Type Certificate/Production Certificate) holder. Based on this, I also informed them that under these circumstances I could not issue a DAR 8130-3 either, if requested. So, what caused this?

I asked to see their Purchase Order (PO) which at first, they thought irrelevant, but after asking again they provided it. Clearly on their PO standard Terms & Conditions it stated that unless the parts were standard parts, that for New parts trace to the OEM with an 8130-3 or EASA Form 1 is required. The initial root cause:

• The supplier did not fulfill the PO Terms & Conditions.
• This company’s receiving inspectors did not flag the parts for not having met their own requirements as expressed in their Terms & Conditions.

Why?

What prompted me to write this article is that this is not an isolated case.

I like to ask this question in a lot of my classes: Is a Purchase Order (PO) a contract? Yes, it is (business law 101). Are any Terms & Conditions (T&C) in a PO a part of that contract? Yes, they are.

Investigating for the root cause a little deeper, it seems both parties agreed to the transaction and available documentation (which was subsequently shown to be inadequate) during the quoting process. The actual PO was then subsequently issued by the company to the supplier whose T&Cs were not heeded by either party.

We need to talk.

Here are some quick, honest assessments of things occurring in our marketplace regarding this type of occurrence:

• When the supplier is confronted about not meeting the subsequent T&Cs in the PO, the supplier forwards all the emails exchanged whereby during the quoting process the company was shown the available pictures and documentation, and the company inferred their acceptance (by any number of means), so why reject it now?
• The purchasing employee of the company is primarily driven by the availability of the Part Number, price, and condition, and meeting their quotas for work output. Satisfied with this, the purchaser paid scant attention to the documentation provided and trace, and truth be known the purchaser is not after all, a documentation forensics expert. If it gets through their receiving inspectors, it must be good, right? Not to mention the supplier is on their Approved Suppliers List, so they must be good, right? There, I said it, and I meant it.
• The supplier, satisfied with the results of the quoting process, did not read the T&Cs issued in the subsequent PO.
• The company’s receiving inspector stated that those T&Cs are boiler plate, standard text on every PO, and that if there were any real special requirements it would be added as free text just below the PN field for the inspector to look for. Really?

And there you have it.

Scenario 2:

Here’s another example I encountered during an audit. I was reviewing the records associated with an order that had just shipped. The records reviewed included the customer’s PO and all documents sent with the order. From the review it became obvious that a requirement stated in the customer’s PO had not been complied with, resulting in an NCR (Non-Conforming Report). The Corrective Action included remedial training for all their sales employees. The focus of the training was that regardless of the outcome of the quoting process, the subsequently issued PO from the customer has to be carefully reviewed to assure all its requirements are being met.

Scenario 3:

Here's another pesky scenario which contributes to non-compliance with T&Cs. For Scenario 2 a good question to ask is, didn’t the supplier’s Shipping Inspector read the customer’s PO for any special requirements? Some of you do and some of you don’t. I encounter this during my observations of shipping inspections during audits. For those of you that don’t, the answer is always that if there had been any special requirements T&Cs, their ERP system would have it noted for the inspector to check during the shipping process, so the actual customer PO would not have to be reviewed. For many such arrangements those special requirements would be reflected in the Pick Ticket. That’s acceptable of course…but here’s the problem. Someone has to carefully review all T&Cs on the customer PO and manually enter that in the system. This requires discipline which is not consistently evident.

During audits when I’m told that any customer special requirement T&Cs will be noted on the Pick Ticket, I’ll ask to see the customer’s PO anyway, and guess what? Occasionally something was missed, a failure in the process.

Scenario 4:

An unfortunate but common practice which leads to missed T&Cs is that they are not easily accessible. The two common examples:

• The T&Cs are stated to be at their website. You’ll be surprised at how often the link does not work. Also, if the PO with the link actually works, when the PO is copied or printed, the hyperlink feature won’t work and the web address has to be manually entered, a long process. Such posted T&Cs may be technically acceptable, but if we’re honest they seldom get read.
• The customer makes the supplier sign or acknowledge the customer’s standard T&Cs. In some cases, it may be a part of an agreement or contract. Regardless, how do you flow this down into your system?

I know many of you have best practices regarding these scenarios. If you don’t mind sharing those, put them in the comments.

Over ‘n out

Roy ‘Royboy’ Resto

www.Linkedin.com/in/royresto

www.AimSolutionsConsulting.com

Written without the aid of AI content.